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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under UCA §78-31 a-19, Arbitration Act, appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues are presented to the Court for review, together with the
respective standards of review:
FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL
Issue: Under UCA §78-3la-14(b), did the trial court properly confirm the
arbitration award and deny Osequera's Motion to Partially Vacate the Arbitration Award
on the basis that there were no findings, by clear and direct evidence, that the arbitrator
was partial or guilty of any misconduct that prejudiced the substantial rights of
Osequera?
Standard of Review:

In reviewing the Order of the trial court denying

Osequera's Motion to Partially Vacate the Arbitration Award and confirming the
arbitration award, the trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and
findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Soft Solutions v.
Brigham Young Univ., 1 P.3d 1095, (Utah 2000).
SECOND ISSUE ON APPEAL
Issue: Under CJA, Rule 4-501(3)(B)(C) and (F), was it proper for the trial court
to not hold an oral argument hearing on Osequera's Motion to Partially Vacate the
Arbitration Award and on Farmers' 56(f) Motion when neither party requested a hearing
in their principal memoranda and where Osequera's Motion issues were authoritatively
1

decided?
Standard of Review:

In reviewing the action of the trial court not allowing

a hearing prior to its Notice of Decision and Memorandum and Order, the Court's actions
are reviewed for correctness. Soft Solutions v. Brigham Young Univ., 1 P.3d 1095, (Utah
2000).
DETERMINATIVE RULES OF APPEAL
UCA §78-31a-14(b), Vacation of award by the court:
(1)

Upon motion to the court by any party to the arbitration proceeding
for vacation of the award, the court shall vacate the award if it
appears: (b) an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, showed partiality, or
an arbitrator was guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the rights of
any party.

CIA, Rule 4-501:
(3)

Hearings (B)

In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action
any claim in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at
the time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in
opposition to a motion may file a written request for a hearing.

(C)

Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the
dispositive issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of
the motion has been authoritatively decided.

(F)

If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file
their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed
waived.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

On April 29, 1998, Osequera was involved in a motor vehicle accident for which
2

she received $65,600 for sustained injuries from the responsible party's insurance
company and Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits.

After receiving $65,600 in

settlement, Osequera made an Underinsured Motorist Coverage (UIM) claim with Farmers
Insurance. Osequera's counsel and Farmers could not agree as to the amount of UIM
benefits owed to Osequera; therefore, they both agreed to UIM arbitration under the
policy. Osequera and Farmers agreed to use an attorney, Paul Felt, as the arbitrator.
The arbitration was held on October 18, 1999, with both parties having submitted
stipulated medical records and medical expert reports.
testimony.

There was no live medical

On October 19, 1999, Arbitrator Felt returned his Findings of Fact and

Arbitration Award. On November 4,1999, Osequera filed a Complaint to Partially Vacate
the Arbitration Award. After Farmers filed an Answer on January 7, 2000, Osequera filed
a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 10, 2000, without requesting a hearing. On
January 20, 2000, Farmers filed a Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance, without requesting
a hearing.
On February 29, 2000, the trial court rendered a Memorandum Decision and Order
(1) denying Farmers Rule 56(f) Motion as unnecessary; (2) denying Osequera's Motion
to Partially Vacate the Arbitration Award; and (3) affirming the arbitration award. On
November 30, 2000, Osequera filed a Rule 60(b)(6) Motion for relief from the judgment
of the trial court dismissing Plaintiffs Motion to Partially Vacate the Arbitration Award.
The trial court denied the 60(b)(6) Motion and the decision was appealed to the Utah
Supreme Court.
3

FACTS
1.

On April 29, 1998, Appellant Osequera was involved in a motor vehicle

accident for which she received $65,600 for sustained injuries from the responsible party's
insurance company and Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits. (R. 36 |1)
2.

After receiving $65,600 in settlement, Osequera made an Underinsured

Motorist Coverage (UIM) claim with Farmers Insurance. (R. 125 ^fl)
3.

Osequera5s counsel and Farmers could not agree as to the amount of UIM

benefits owed to Osequera; therefore, they both agreed to UIM arbitration under the
policy. (R. 125 %2)
4.

Under the UIM arbitration provision, the only issue to be decided was the

amount of damages, if any, owed under the UIM coverage. (R. 140)
5*

Osequera5 s counsel and Farmers both agreed to use Arbitrator/Attorney Paul

Felt as the arbitrator and both called his office in a conference call to arrange the
scheduling of the arbitration. (R. 126 f3)
6.

Both parties submitted arbitration pre-hearing statements with medical

records and medical expert reports for the arbitrator to review prior to the arbitration. (R.
126 f4)
7.

The UIM arbitration was held on October 18, 1999, and consisted of both

parties arguing their positions before the arbitrator based on the submitted and stipulated
medical records; stipulated medical expert reports; and testimony of Osequera. There was
no live medical expert testimony. (R. 126 f4 and R. 167, depo. pg. 11, lines 4-18)
4

8.

On October 19, 1999, Arbitrator Felt returned his Findings of Fact and

Arbitration Award of $15,000 UIM benefits owed by Farmers to Osequera. (R. 122)
9.

In pertinent part, Arbitrator Felt explained the following in his Findings of

Fact (R. 36 f3):
3.
Plaintiff also claims that this accident caused an injury to her back.
The first real complaint of back pain was not made by Plaintiff until November 2,
1998, which is six months after the accident. An MRI on 11-9-98 revealed an
L2/3 disc herniation with extruding disc fragment displacing the L-3 nerve root.
The MRI also showed other degenerative changes at L-5/S-1. Back surgery was
performed on 1-26-99. I find that it is extremely unlikely that Plaintiffs back
problem was caused by the accident. My experience is that if an accident caused
a disc herniation, this herniation becomes painful and symptomatic much earlier
than six months post accident. The 5-13-98 reference to thigh sensation on the leg
which had the cast is not sufficient to qualify as a back complaint. Plaintiff is
fluent enough in English to have made it clear to Dr. Home if her back was
painful.
10.

Aside from the specific evidence addressed by Arbitrator Felt in his Findings

of Fact, other evidence presented by Farmers in the arbitration was the following (R. 141148):
(a)
After reviewing the imaging studies performed on Ms. Osequera, Radiologist
Dr. Paul E. Berger found that Plaintiff had a very common pre-existing lumbar
degenerative disc disease and that based upon the medical records reviewed and
imaging findings detailed in his report, it was concluded that the disc abnormality
at L2-3 was not causally related to the motor vehicle accident of April 29, 1998.
(b)
At least one month prior to the accident, Plaintiff had been seen for
complaints of pain up the leg to the hip and to the lumbar area of the back.
(c)
At the accident scene, Ms. Osequera reported she had no back pain and did
not mention any low back pain to any of her health care providers until six months
post accident.
(d)

On September 29, 1998, (five months post accident) Plaintiff reported to her
5

doctor that she had fallen down some stairs carrying laundry. Her initial post
accident back pain complaints began a month and a half after this report of her
falling down the stairs (i.e., 6 months post accident).
11.

After receiving notice of the arbitration award, Farmers mailed Osequera's

counsel the $15,000 arbitration award check and a UIM Release to be signed and returned
before negotiating the draft. The award check was cashed by Osequera and her counsel,
but the Release was never signed and returned. (R. 126-127)
12.

On November 4, 1999, Osequera filed a Complaint to Partially Vacate the

Arbitration Award and, upon being served, Farmers filed an Answer on December 9,
1999. (R. 1-6 and R. 42-46)
13.

On January 7, 2000, Osequera filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

without requesting a hearing. (R. 47-54)
14.

On January 20, 2000, Farmers filed a Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance,

without requesting a hearing, to depose Arbitrator Paul Felt in order to respond to
Osequera's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 91)
15.

On January 28, 2000, Osequera filed a Response to Farmer's Rule 56(f)

Motion, claiming the arbitrator's deposition was not necessary; would not shed light on
any issue; and that the request for deposition should be denied. (R. 93-104)
16.

After a Notice to Submit for Decision was filed on February 14, 2000 (R.

112), the Court, on February 29, 2000, filed a Memorandum Decision and Order (1)
denying Farmers' Rule 56(f) Motion as unnecessary; (2) denying Osequera's Motion to
Partially Vacate the Arbitration Award; and (3) affirmed the arbitration award, stating in
6

part(R. 119-121):
Starting from the proposition that the public policy underlying arbitration
aims for "a speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating disputes/' DeVore v.
IHCHospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah, 1994), the Utah supreme court has
made clear that "[t]he standard of review for a trial court reviewing an arbitration
award is an extremely narrow one: "The court should give considerable leeway to
the arbitrator, setting aside his or her decision only in certain narrow
circumstances." Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 948 (quoting First Options of
Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995)). "The trial court must 'give considerable
discretion to the arbitrator,5 even when the trial court disagrees with the award or
believes the arbitrator made a factual or legal error." Pacific Development, L.C.,
v. Orton, 982 P.2d 94,97 (Utah 1999); Intermountain Power Agency v. Union
Pacific RR Co., 961 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998). "It is a settled rule in the
construction of awards that no intendment shall be indulged[] to overturn an award,
but every reasonable intendment shall be allowed to uphold it." Jensen v. The
Deep Creek Farm and Live Stock Co., 74 P. 427, 430 (Utah 1903).
While taking the arbitrator's deposition might clarify the basis of his
judgment, the Court concludes that neither a continuance nor additional discovery
is necessary because, as a matter of law, Plaintiff has not articulated an adequate
basis for vacating or modifying the arbitrator's award.
Even if the Court were to assume, arguendo, that the arbitrator based his
Award on an improper factual or legal ground, Plaintiffs argument still cannot be
sustained. As explained before, it is beyond this Court's power to vacate an
arbitration award on the basis of factual or legal error. Pacific Dev.y supra, at 97.
More importantly, Plaintiff has failed to cite any binding or persuasive authority
analyzing what constitutes "misconduct" in the context of state or federal arbitration
law. See Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 948, n.5 (noting that Utah courts may look
to the Federal Arbitration Act [which like the Utah act, is based on the Uniform
Arbitration Act] and to the law of other states for guidance). Utah law on the
subject of "misconduct" is limited but what there is suggests that Plaintiffs claims
in this case, even if taken as true, are insufficient to establish misconduct affecting
the substantial rights of a party.
17.

On June 27, 2000, Osequera filed an Appeal to this Court under Case No.

20000632-SC seeking a review of the trial court's judgment and order denying Osequera's
Motion to Partially Vacate the Arbitration Award. (R. 198)
7

18.

On October 11, 2000, this Court signed an Order and Notice of Decision

dismissing Osequera's appeal. (R. 205-206)
19.

On November 30, 2000, Osequera, for the first time, filed a Rule

60(b)(6)Motion for relief from the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiffs
Motion to Partially Vacate the Arbitration Award. (R. 208-214)
20.

On December 12, 2000, one day before Fanners was required to file its

Memorandum in Opposition, the trial court denied Plaintiffs 60(b)(6) Motion ruling that,
in addition to other things, the Court had reviewed all of the submissions since the entry
of judgment of February 29, 2000, and that nothing in those documents called into
question the Court's original decision to deny Plaintiffs Motion. (R. 216)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court was correct in finding that Osequera had not met her burden of
proof, by certain and direct evidence, that Arbitrator Felt was partial or guilty of
misconduct that prejudiced the substantial rights of Osequera. The record clearly shows
that (1) both parties agreed to arbitrate the UIM coverage under the policy; (2) both
parties agreed to use Arbitrator Felt as the arbitrator; (3) Arbitrator Felt was impartial and
was qualified in both personal injury and insurance issues to arbitrate the issues involved;
(4) both parties presented all of their evidence through stipulated medical expert reports,
medical records and through the testimony of Osequera; and (5) Arbitrator Felt considered
all of the evidence presented in making his decision and award.
8

While Arbitrator Felt does use the phrase "in my experience . . . " in one part of his
Findings of Fact, the record is clear that he considered all of the evidence in making his
arbitration decision and award as evidenced by (1) his deposition testimony that he
considered all the evidence in making his decision; (2) the invoice for the arbitration
illustrates that Arbitrator Felt reviewed the evidence before and again after the arbitration;
(3) paragraph 3 of the arbitrator's decision reveals that his decision was based on the
evidence; and (4) the other evidence submitted by Farmers supports the arbitrator's
decision. Also, the record is clear that Arbitrator Felt did not take "judicial notice" of one
medical expert's evidence over another; but instead, took recognition of the various
medical specialties of all of the medical experts who provided reports in regard to the
arbitration.

The expert reports were stipulated into evidence for the arbitrator's

consideration and neither party presented live medical expert testimony.
Under CJA, Rule 4-501(3)(B)(C) and (F), the trial court was correct in not allowing
oral argument with regard to Osequera's Motion to Partially Vacate the Arbitration Award
(i.e. Motion for Summary Judgment) or Farmers' Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance
because neither party requested oral argument before the decision of the trial court was
made and Osequera's issues argued in her motion were authoritatively decided by the trial
court.

9

ARGUMENTS
L

UNDER CURRENT UTAH LAW, THE TRIAL COURT WAS
CORRECT IN CONFIRMING THE ARBITRATION AWARD AND
DENYING OSEQUERA'S MOTION TO PARTIALLY VACATE THE
ARBITRATION AWARD BECAUSE THERE IS NO CLEAR AND
DIRECT EVIDENCE FOR FINDING THE ARBITRATOR WAS
PARTIAL OR GUILTY OF ANY MISCONDUCT THAT
PREJUDICED THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF OSEQUERA AS
REQUIRED UNDER UCA §78-31a-14(b).

Under current Utah law, in reviewing the Order of the trial court confirming the
arbitration award and denying Osequera's Motion to Partially Vacate the Arbitration
Award (filed by Osequera as a Motion for Summary Judgment), the trial court's
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and findings of fact are reviewed under
the clearly erroneous standard. Soft Solutions v. Brigham Young Univ., 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah
2000). Under Soft Solutions, the scope of review by this court is limited to the legal issue
of whether the trial court correctly exercised its authority in confirming the arbitration
award and the trial court's authority is subject to the following guidelines:
(1)

The standard for reviewing an arbitration award is highly deferential
to the arbitrator;

(2)

The trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
arbitrator, nor may it modify or vacate an award because it disagrees
with the arbitrator's assessment;

(3)

Standard of review for a trial court is an extremely narrow one
giving considerable leeway to the arbitrator and setting aside the
arbitrator's decision only in certain narrow circumstances; and

10

(4)

Given the public policy in law and support of arbitration, judicial
review of arbitration awards confirmed pursuant to the act is limited
to those grounds and procedures provided for under the act.

The statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award are found in UCA §78-3 la14(b), wherein it states that the Court shall only vacate the award if there is partiality of
the arbitrator or the arbitrator is guilty of misconduct that prejudices the rights of any
party. The burden of proof evidencing partiality falls upon the movant, Osequera, and the
evidence must be certain and direct, not remote, uncertain or speculative. DeVore v. IHC
Hospitals, 884 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1994). Unless there is direct and certain evidence of
dishonesty or unfairness resulting in partiality affecting the substantial rights of a party,
an arbitration award should not be disturbed, reviewed or substituted, even if the Court
does not agree with the award. See Bivans v. Utah Lake, Land, Water & Power Co., VIA
P. 1126 (Utah 1918); Giannopulos v. Poppas, 15 P.2d 353 (Utah 1932); and DeVore v.
IHC Hospitals, 884 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1994).
Based on a thorough review of the record, it should be determined that there is no
basis for finding that Arbitrator Felt was partial or guilty of any misconduct that
prejudiced the substantial rights of Osequera. Instead, the record is clear that Arbitrator
Felt acted properly within his authority in regard to all aspects of the arbitration process,
findings and award. This conclusion is based on the following:
1.

Both parties agreed to arbitrate the UIM coverage under the policy

11

and both agreed to have Attorney Paul Felt serve as the arbitrator. (R. 126 f3)
2.

Arbitrator Paul Felt has over 28 years of experience as an attorney

(representing both plaintiffs and defendants); as a participant in mediations and
arbitrations; and as an arbitrator and mediator himself. He has tried more than 100 jury
trials; and has arbitrated/mediated over 200 cases. (R. 165, depo. pgs. 4-5)
3.

In his deposition, Arbitrator Felt made it clear that he has no close

relationship of any kind with Claim Representative Robert Payne of Farmers Insurance.
(R. 168, depo. pg. 15)
4.

Arbitrator Felt was also very clear in his deposition that he considered

all of the evidence presented by both Osequera and Farmers in making his arbitration
award, and that there was no evidence presented which he did not consider (R. 167, depo.
pg. 12). (Under Utah law, the testimony of the arbitrator on what he considered in
making his decision is admissible. Giannopulos, at 355). The arbitration billing statement
(R. 137) also documents that he reviewed the medical records and medical expert reports
before and again after the arbitration, before rendering decision.
5.

Even in paragraph 3 of the Arbitrator's Findings of Fact and Award,

(R. 122 f3), Arbitrator Felt mentioned some of the evidence supporting his finding that
Osequera's back problem did not result from the accident when he stated:
3.
Plaintiff also claims that this accident caused an injury to her back.
The first real complaint of back pain was not made by Plaintiff until November 2,

12

1998, which is six months after the accident. An MRI on 11-9-98 revealed an
L2/3 disc herniation with extruding disc fragment displacing the L-3 nerve root.
The MRI also showed other degenerative changes at L-5/S-1. Back surgery was
performed on 1-26-99. I find that it is extremely unlikely that Plaintiffs back
problem was caused by the accident. My experience is that if an accident caused
a disc herniation, this herniation becomes painful and symptomatic much earlier
than six months post accident. The 5-13-98 reference to thigh sensation on the leg
which had the cast is not sufficient to qualify as a back complaint. Plaintiff is
fluent enough in English to have made it clear to Dr. Home if her back was
painful.
The record is clear that Arbitrator Felt made his decision and award based on
consideration of all the evidence. While Osequera has argued as to the evidence she feels
the arbitrator should have accepted, the record demonstrates there was more credible,
convincing evidence presented by Farmers, as illustrated by the following (R. 141-148):
(a)

After reviewing the imaging studies performed on Ms. Osequera,
Radiologist Dr. Paul E. Berger found that Plaintiff had a very common preexisting lumbar degenerative disc disease and that based upon the medical
records reviewed and imaging findings detailed in his report, it was
concluded that the disc abnormality at L2-3 was not causally related to the
motor vehicle accident of April 29, 1998.

(b)

At least one month prior to the accident, Plaintiff had been seen for
complaints of pain up the leg to the hip and to the L-7 area of the back.

(c)

At the accident scene, Ms. Osequera reported she had no back pain and did
not mention any low back pain to any of her health providers until six
months post accident.

(d)

On September 29,1998, (five months post accident) Plaintiff reported to her
doctor that she had fallen down some stairs carrying laundry. Her initial
post accident back pain complaints began a month and a half after this
report of her falling down the stairs (i.e., 6 months post accident).

Osequera incorrectly claims that Arbitrator Felt used his own personal experience
13

in place of any of the offered medical evidence in making his award. The mere fact that
Arbitrator Felt, in his written award, used the words, "in my experience . . .", does not
mean that he did not consider the evidence presented.

Paragraph 3 of the award,

Arbitrator Felt's deposition testimony, the billing statement and other evidence make it
clear that he did. An arbitrator should not be required or expected to totally disregard his
personal and/or professional experience when considering the weight of expert testimony.
An arbitrator is the exclusive person to determine the facts in the case and to consider and
weigh the expert evidence for that purpose.
Osequera also incorrectly argues that Arbitrator Felt improperly took formal
"judicial notice" of scientific principals and evidence in the medical opinions rendered by
the neurologists and radiologists in their medical reports submitted as evidence in the
arbitration; however, it is clear from Arbitrator Felt's deposition that if he took judicial
notice of anything, it was simply that he recognized the difference in specialties between
what a radiologist does and what an orthopedic specialist does, not as to the opinions and
findings of those specialists (R. 171, depo. pg. 29, lines 2-25 and pg. 30, lines 1-2). It
is important to point out that Arbitrator Felt took recognition of the types and specialties
of all six involved medical providers by accepting the medical records and medical expert
reports submitted by both parties into evidence without requiring all the providers to
testify as part of the arbitration. Both parties stipulated to the medical records and expert
reports without laying a foundation for the reports (R. 167, depo pg. 11, lines 4-11).
14

Neither party presented evidence by live medical expert testimony, only through the
reports. Arbitrator Felt should have every right to use his experience and knowledge to
recognize the various medical specialists involved and consider all the medical evidence
of both parties on that basis.
The two Utah cases on which Osequera relies concerning personal experience and
expert testimony are simply not applicable in this arbitration award and decision review.
Both cases, Brady v. Gibb, 886 P.2d 104 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) mdDearden v. San Pedro,
L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 93 P.271 (Utah 1907), deal with issues concerning improper jury
instructions, not an arbitrator's weighing of expert opinions in medical reports which were
submitted as evidence by stipulation. The other cases concerning judicial notice are also
inapplicable as there was no judicial notice taken of any medical opinion evidence.
Based on the record, it should be determined that the trial court correctly exercised
its authority when it determined the following (R. 119-121):
Starting from the proposition that the public policy underlying arbitration
aims for "a speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating disputes," DeVore v.
IHCHospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994), the Utah supreme court has
made clear that "[t]he standard of review for a trial court reviewing an arbitration
award is an extremely narrow one: "The court should give considerable leeway to
the arbitrator, setting aside his or her decision only in certain narrow
circumstances." Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 948 (quoting First Options of
Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995)). "The trial court must 'give considerable
discretion to the arbitrator,' even when the trial court disagrees with the award or
believes the arbitrator made a factual or legal error." Pacific Development, L.C.,
v. Orton, 982 P.2d 94, 97 (Utah 1999); Intermountain Power Agency v. Union
Pacific RR Co., 961 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998). "It is a settled rule in the
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construction of awards that no intendment shall be indulged[] to overturn an award,
but every reasonable intendment shall be allowed to uphold it." Jensen v. The
Deep Creek Farm and Live Stock Co., 74 P. 427, 430 (Utah 1903).
While taking the arbitrator's deposition might clarify the basis of his
judgment, the Court concludes that neither a continuance nor additional discovery
is necessary because, as a matter of law, Plaintiff hats not articulated an adequate
basis for vacating or modifying the arbitrator's award.
Even if the Court were to assume, arguendo, that the arbitrator based his
award on an improper factual or legal ground, Plaintiffs argument still cannot be
sustained. As explained before, it is beyond this Court's power to vacate an
arbitration award on the basis of factual or legal error. Pacific Dev., supra, at 97.
More importantly, Plaintiff has failed to cite any binding or persuasive authority
analyzing what constitutes "misconduct" in the context of state or federal arbitration
law. See Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 948, n.5 (noting that Utah courts may look
to the Federal Arbitration Act [which like the Utah Act, is based on the Uniform
Arbitration Act] and to the law of other states for guidance). Utah law on the
subject of "misconduct" is limited but what there is suggests that Plaintiffs claims
in this case, even if taken as true, are insufficient to establish misconduct affecting
the substantial rights of a party.
H.

UNDER CJA, RULE 4-501(3)(B)(C) AND (F), THE TRIAL COURT
RULED PROPERLY WHEN IT DID NOT HOLD AN ORAL
ARGUMENT HEARING ON OSEQUERA'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (I.E. MOTION TO PARTIALLY VACATE
ARBITRATION AWARD) AND ON FARMERS' 56(f) MOTION
BECAUSE, NOT ONLY DID NEITHER PARTY REQUEST A
HEARING IN THEIR MOTIONS, OSEQUERA'S MOTION ISSUES
WERE AUTHORITATIVELY DECIDED.

Under CJA, Rule 4-501 (F), if a request for a hearing is not made in the principal
memoranda, the request is considered waived. The record is clear that, in her Motion to
Vacate Arbitration Award, Osequera did not request a hearing (R. 47-54). In response to
Osequera's Motion to Partially Vacate the Arbitration Award, Farmers filed a Rule 56(f)
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Motion for Continuance to permit the taking of the arbitrator's deposition in order to
respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment. This Motion was also made without
requesting a hearing (R. 91). There were no requests for hearing made before the trial
court's Memorandum Decision and Order of February 29, 2000.
Even if, for argument sake, it was determined that Farmers' Request for Hearing,
which was filed well after the trial court's Order, should have been recognized, under
CJA, Rule 4-501(3)(C), the District Court was not required to allow oral arguments as
asserted by Plaintiff because the Court clearly found that the dispositive issues governing
the denial of Osequera's Motion to Partially Vacate the Arbitration Award were
authoritatively decided. In its Memorandum Decision and Order of February 29, 2000 (R.
119-121), the trial court stated the following (emphasis added):
While taking the arbitrator's deposition may clarify the basis of his
judgment, the Court concludes that neither a continuance nor additional discovery
is necessary because, as a matter of law, Plaintiff has not articulated an adequate
basis for vacating or modifying the arbitrator's award. Even if the Court were to
assume, arguendo, that the arbitrator based his award on an improper factual or
legal ground. Plaintiffs argument still cannot be sustained. As explained below,
it is beyond this court's power to vacate an arbitration award on the basis of factual
or legal error.
Even in Osequera's own response to Farmers' Rule 56(f) Motion, Osequera
claimed, ,fthe deposition of the arbitrator is unnecessary as all facts are undisputed and the
additional facts to be gained by the arbitrator's deposition are immaterial to Plaintiffs
claim." Osequera requested that Farmers' Rule 56(f) Motion, which was to take the
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arbitrator's deposition and make it part of the evidence, be denied. The Court in its
ruling, denied Farmers' Rule 56(f) Motion, refusing to accept the deposition testimony as
being unnecessary because Osequera had not asserted adequate grounds for vacating or
modifying the arbitrator's award.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly confirmed the arbitration award and properly denied
Osequera's Motion to Partially Vacate the Arbitration Award because Osequera did not
present evidence to meet the required burden of proof, by clear and direct evidence, that
Arbitrator Felt was partial or guilty of misconduct which prejudiced the substantial rights
of Osequera. The record clearly demonstrates that (1) both parties agreed to arbitrate the
UIM coverage under the policy with Felt as the arbitrator; (2) Arbitrator Felt was
impartial and well qualified to serve as the arbitrator; (3) all of the evidence presented by
both parties was considered in making the arbitration award; and (4) Arbitrator Felt based
his decision on the greater weight of the evidence.
The mere fact that Arbitrator Felt, in his written award, used the phrase, "in my
experience. . .," does not mean that he did not consider the evidence presented. It is clear
from the record that he did, as evidenced by (1) his deposition testimony stating he
considered all the evidence; (2) the invoice for the arbitration showing time spent
reviewing records before and again after the arbitration; (3) the arbitrator's reasoning in
paragraph 3 of the decision; and (4) other supporting evidence identified in the record.
18

' I he record also demonstrates that Arbitrator Felt did nc t take " ji idicial notice'1 of
the medical opinions asserted in the medical expert reports; but instead, the record clearly
documents that he simply recognized the different medical specialties of the various
doctors generating the medical expert reports and opinions because neither party presented
live medical testimony and all medical expert reports and records were admitted as
evidence through stipulation by the parties.
Finally, the trial court, under CJA, Rule 4-501(C) and (F), was correct when it did
not hold an oral argument hearing before issuing its Memonr ; , .; : >--HI >• '

Order

confirming the arbitration award and denying Osequera's Motion to Partially Vacate the
Arbitration Award because neither party requested a hearing in their principal memoranda
as required under Rule 4-501(C) and, therefore, under Rule 4- 501(1 ), the right for a
hearing was considered waived. Osequera's attempt to rely on Farmers' request for
hearing, made well after the trial court's Memorandum Decision and Order, is
inappropriate. Even if, for purpose of argument, the request for a hearing was properly
made, the fact that the issues brought up in Osequera's Motion were authoritatively
decided by the trial court made the hearing unnecessary under Rule 4-501(C). The trial
court authoritatively decided the issues in Osequera's Motion when it properly determined
that under current Utah law, even if there had been a factual or legal error made in the
arbitration, it would have been beyond the trial court's authority to vacate an arbitration
award on the basis of factual or legal error.
19

Based on the foregoing, Farmers requests (1) that the arbitration award be
confirmed; (2) Osequera's Motion to Partially Vacate the Arbitration Award be denied;
(3) that Osequera's request to have this matter re-arbitrated be denied; and (4) Osequera's
Rule 60(b) Motion hearing be denied.
DATED this

7 ""day of

0^i^rf

, 2001.
PETERSEN & HANSEN

Gary D. Josephsoi/
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee

20

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief
of Appellee was this

of August, 2001, mailed first class, postage prepaid to the

following:
Loren M. Lambert
Arrow Legal Solutions
266 East 7200 South
Midvale, Utah 84047

21

ADDENDUM

(A)

Memorandum Decision and Order

(B)

UCA §78-31a-14(b)

(C)

CJA, Rule 4-501(3)(B)(C) and (F)

(D)

Ruling on Motion for Relief from Judgment
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Sandy Department

LEOPOLDrNAOSEQUERA
Piaiiuitr.
vs.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
Civil No. 990410525

)
)
)

_)

This matter comes before the Court following Defendant's filing of a Notice to Submit for
Decision on its Rule 56(0 Motion for Continuance. The requested continuance is to allow time to depose
the arbitrator who entered Findings of Fact and Award in a matter which the parties arbitrated in
accordance with a pre-existing contractual agreement.
At the outset the Court notes that the procedural posture of this case is somewhat confused due to
the manner in which the case was initiated by Plaintiff and pursued by the parties. Under Utah law, the
proper procedure to challenge an arbitration award is not by way of a Complaint, but rather by "[filing] a
single motion to vacate or amend, requiring a single response[J" this approach being consistent with "the
expedited procedure contemplated by the statutes and required by the policies underlying arbitration.v See
Buzas Baseball. Inc.. et ai, v. Salt Lake Tappers, Inc.. 925 P.2d 941. 947 n.4 (Utah 1996); Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-3 la-14. -15. However characterized. Plaintiff seeks to vacate a portion of the award on two
grounds: First, under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-14( l)(b). she claims the arbitrator engaged in misconduct
that prejudiced her rights by looking to his "experience" rather than to the expert testimony received as the
basis for rejecting Plaintiffs back-injury claim. Second, she claims that, under the terms of the contract
providing for arbitration, it was error not to require Defendant to pay the interpreter fees incurred in the
arbitration.
Following Defendant's Answer, Plaintiff filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment/11 Plaintiffs
motion in turn triggered the issue presently before the Court - Defendant's Rule 56(f) motion.
Starting from the proposition that the public policy underlying arbitration aims for c*a speedy and
inexpensive method of adjudicating disputes," DcVore v. IHC Hospitals. Inc., 884 P.2d 1246, 125 I (Utah
1994), the Utah supreme court has made clear that "[t]he standard of review for a trial court reviewing an
arbitration award is an extremely narrow one: 'The court should give considerable leeway to the arbitrator,
setting aside his or her decision only in certain narrow circumstances/" Buzas BasebalL 925 P.2d at 948
(quoting First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan. 5 14 U.S. 938 (1995)). "The trial court must 'give

l

That Motion was. strictly speaking, unnecessary once review was sought under U.C.A. § 78-3 la-14. The
rt will treat it as seeking disposition under the statutory provisions to vacate the award.

considerable discretion to the arbitrator,' even when the trial court disagrees with the award or believes the
arbitrator made a factual or legal error." Pacific Development. LC... v. Orion. 982 P.2d 94. 97 (Utah
1999); Iniermoumam Power Agency v. Union Pacific RR Co.. 961 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998). "It is a
settled rule in the construction of awards that no intendment shall be indulged[J to overturn an award, but
every reasonable intendment shall be allowed to uphold \Cy Jensen v. The Deep Creek Farm and Live
Stock Co.. 74 P. 427. 430 (Utah 1903).
In this case Plaintiff claims arbitrator misconduct, one of the ""narrow set of statutory grounds"
upon which the Court may vacate an award. Pacific Dev., 982 P.2d at 96, *,|. 8. The claimed misconduct
involves the arbitrator improperly substituting his judgment for that of expert witnesses and. as evidence.
Plaintiff cites to *' 3 in the Findings of Fact and Award. In *j 3 the arbitrator, after citing medical evidence
regarding the Plaintiffs back injury states: "I find that it is extremely unlikely that plaintiffs back problem
was caused by the accident. My experience is that if an accident caused a disc herniation, this herniation
becomes painful and symptomatic much earlier than six months post accident. The 5/23/98 reference to
thigh sensation on the leg which had the cast is not sufficient to qualify as a back complaint. Plaintiff is
fluent enough in English to have made it clear to Dr. Home if her back was painful." (emphasis added).
The entire weight of Plaintiffs argument rests on the words **[mjy experience is . . f Plaintiff
argues that the arbitrator's use of that language must be taken to mean that the decision was a personal
judgment made in total disregard for the proffered expert testimony. Working from that premise Plaintiff
then argues that a decision thus reached \s per se "misconduct."
Although the arbitrator's language choice may have been inartful, a close examination of the
arbitrator's findings - summary though they are - reveals that he in fact looked to the medical evidence
including, among other things, the magnetic resonance imaging ("MRJH) test performed on 11/9/98 and the
proffered letter by David E. Curtis. M.D. which noted "thigh complaints of 05-13-98 which probably
represented a complaint of pain, numbness and tingling in the L3 nerve distribution. . . ." Paragraph 3 of
the Findings of Fact and Award also closely mirrors the conclusions of another expert. Paul Berger. M.D..
whose report stated that "|t|hc medical records do not describe any evidence of low back pain until
approximately 6 months following the motor vehicle accident. Had the motor vehicle accident been
directly, causally related to this finding, one would have assumed at least some complaints of back
problems prior to that time." (quoted in the "Personal Injury Report & Board Certified Impairment
Rating," dated 9/2 1/99. prepared by Jeffrey A. States, D.C., at page 4). Notwithstanding the personalized
language of this Finding, it appears to this Court that the arbitrator's Findings and Award reflected, sub
silentio, an acceptance of one expert's conclusions and rejection of contrary evidence.
While taking the arbitrator's deposition might clarify the basis of his judgment, the Court
concludes that neither a continuance nor additional discovery is necessary because, as a matter of law.
Plaintiff has not articulated an adequate basis for vacating or modifying the arbitrator's award.
Even if the Court were to assume, arguendo, that the arbitrator based his Award on an improper
factual or legal ground. Plaintiffs argument still cannot be sustained. As explained before, it is beyond
this Court's power to vacate an arbitration award on the basis of factual or legal error. Pacific Dev.,
supra, at 97. More importantly. Plaintiff has failed to cite any binding or persuasive authority analyzing
what constitutes "misconduct"* in the context of state or federal arbitration law. See Buzas Baseball. 925
P.2d at 948. n.? (noting that Utah courts may look to the Federal Arbitration Act [which like the Utah act,
is based on the Uniform Arbitration Act] and to the law of other states for guidance). Utah law on the
subject of "misconduct" is limited but what there is suggests that Plaintiffs claims in this case, even it
taken as true, are insufficient to establish misconduct affecting the substantial rights of a party. See. e.g..

Giannopulos v. Poppas. 15 P.2d 353 (Utah 1932) and cases cited therein. In Giannopulos the coun found
misconduct where an arbitrator assured a party that it would be given time to present certain testimony,
failed to keep that promise, and further compounded the error by not notifying the other panel members of
the party's request. Under those circumstances the court concluded that the arbitrator's conduct had misled
the party, lulling him into a sense of security so that he did not press his request to the panel at large By
contrast, in this case Plaintiff was in no way foreclosed from presenting her evidence fully Plaintiffs
complaint, at most, reflects her disagreement with the arbitrator's rationale for the Award.
The two Utah cases on which Plaintiff relies are inapposite In one. conflicting jury instructions
were given, thereby creating jury confusion. Brady v. Gibb, 886 P 2d 104 (Utah Ct App. 1994)- The other
case, Dearden v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co.. 93 P. 271 (Utah 1907). also invohed a challenge to a juryinstruction, and the court rejected the claimed error. .
The second claim of error is also unavailing. The arbitrator's alleged refusal to tax Defendant with
interpreter fees falls outside any "of the statutory grounds for vacating the award.
For the foregoing reasons Defendant's Rule 56(f) motion is denied as unnecessary, and Plaintiffs
Motion to Partially Vacate the Arbitration Award (captioned as a Summary Judgment motion) is also
denied. The Arbitration Award is confirmed. So ordered.

Dated this 29 ,h day of February, 2000.

"One of the instructions directed that the jury may only look to expert testimony in determining the
applicable standard of care, whereas another instruction directed that the standard of care could be established by
the common knowledge, experience and understanding of a layman.

ARBITRATION ACT

78-31a-14

certified mail upon all other parties to the proceeding. The notice of motion for
modification shall contain a statement that objections to the motion be served
upon the moving party within ten days after receipt of the notice. Any award
modified by the arbitrators is subject to the provisions of Sections 78-31a-ll,
78-31a-12, and 78-31a-14.
H i s t o r y : C, 1953, 78-31a-13, e n a c t e d by L.
1985, ch. 225, § 1.

Cross-References. — Motions and orders
generally, U R C P 6(b), 6(d), 6(e), 7(b), 43(b)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
either modify or vacate an award forecloses a
comprehensive review on the merits of the
arbitration process Allred v Educators Mut
Ins Ass'n, 909 P2d 1263 (Utah 1996)

ANALYSIS

Failure to timely file.
Time for filing motion
— After judgment confirming award.
Failure to timely file.
The procedural safeguards set out in Subsection (1) of this section and 78-31a-14(2) are
designed to protect against arbitrary, unfair, or
prejudicial treatment in the arbitration process, however, failure to timely file a motion to

Time for filing motion.
— After j u d g m e n t confirming award.
The filing of motions to vacate or modify an
award is barred once the court has entered a
judgment confirming the award Robinson &
Wells v Warren, 669 P2d 844 (Utah 1983).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am Jur. 2d Arbitration
and Award § 143.
A.L.R. — Power of arbitrator to correct, or
power of-court to correct or resubmit, nonlabor
award because of incompleteness or failure to
pass on all matters submitted, 36 A L R 3d 939

Power of court to resubmit matter to arbitrators for correction or clarification, because of
ambiguity or error in, or omission from, arbitration award, 37 A L R 3d 200
Key Numbers. — Arbitration ®=» 63 2, 70

78-3la-14. Vacation of the award by court.
(1) Upon motion to the court by any party to the arbitration proceeding for
vacation of the award, the court shall vacate the award if it appears:
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, showed partiality, or an
arbitrator was guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the rights of any party;
(c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause
shown, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise
conducted the hearing to the substantial prejudice of the rights of a party;
or
(e) there was no arbitration agreement between the parties to the
arbitration proceeding.
(2) A motion to vacate an award shall be made to the court within 20 days
after a copy of the award is served upon the moving party, or if predicated upon
corruption, fraud, or other undue means, within 20 days after the grounds are
known or should have been known.
(3) If an award is vacated on grounds other than in Subsection (l)(e), the
court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators chosen as provided in the
arbitration agreement or by the court. Arbitrators chosen by the court shall be
found qualified to arbitrate the issues involved. The time for making an award,
if specified in the arbitration agreement, is applicable to a rearbitration
519
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OPERATION OF THE COURTS

Rule 4-501

IK'iiIf" 4-1 OH, L o r a h o n s <il (rial c o u r t s of r e c o r d .
Intent:
To designate locations of trial courts of record.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby designated
as locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar City;
Layton; Murray; Orem; Park City; Roosevelt; Roy; Salem; Sandy; Spanish
Fork; West Valley City.
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, any trial court of record may hold
court in any location designated by this rule.
(Added effective January 1, 1992; amended effective November 15, 1995.)

R u l e 4-408J
courts.
Intent:

isibility lor a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of trial

To designate the court locations administered directly through the administrative office of the courts and those administered through contract with local
government pursuant to § 78-3-21.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the trial courts of record and to the administrative
office of the courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) All locations of the juvenile court shall be administered directly through
the administrative office of the courts.
(2) All locations of the district court shall be administered directly through
the administrative office of the courts, except the following, which shall be
administered through contract with county or municipal government pursuant
to § 78-3-21: Coalville, Fillmore, Junction, Kanab, Loa, Manila, Manti, Morgan, Panguitch, Park City, Randolph, and Salem.
(Added effective November 15, 1995; amended effective January 27, 1997;
November 1, 1998.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, in Subdivision (2), substituted "district
court" for "district and circuit courts" and de-

leted "Castle Dale" from the listed exceptions,
The 1998 amendment deleted "Beaver" before "Coalville" in Subdivision (2).

A R T I C L E fi i I\ II VMM T I T E

Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda
and documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on
dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record except
proceedings before the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule
does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary
relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or
ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and

Rule 4-501
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authorities appropriate aflSdavits, and copies of or citations by page number to
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in
support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as
provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on ex-parte
application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and
if the memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a
summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party shall file
and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a
memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation.
If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to the motion
within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party may notify the
clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as provided in paragraph
(1)(D) of this rule.
(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's memorandum.
(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day period
to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the clerk to submit the
matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in the form of a
separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The
Notice to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the motion was
served, the date the memorandum in opposition, if any, was served, the date
the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been
requested. The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties.
If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(2) Motions for summary
judgment.
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in
support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant contends no
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences
and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the
movant relies.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the party contends
a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which
the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence
or sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth
in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to
the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment
unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless
ordered by the court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs
(3)(B) or (4) below.
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or
any claim in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the tim e
of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion
may file a written request for a hearing.
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion
or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set ol
issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively
decided.
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(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the
matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter shall be
heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for hearing and
notify all parties of the date and time.
(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion,
memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or
opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at least
two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly
marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time of the hearing.
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court.
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file
their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived.
(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the
scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date
without leave of the court.
(H) If a hearing has been requested and the non-movmg party fails to file a
memorandum in opposition, the moving party may withdraw the request or
the court on its own motion may strike the request and decide the motion
without oral argument.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal
issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request
may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments and
the rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; November 1, 1996;
November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999; April 1, 2001.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment substituted "trial courts of record" for
"district courts" in the applicability paragraph,
added Subdivision (3)(h), and made a stylistic
change.

The 1999 amendment substituted "claim" for
"issues" in Subdivision (3)(B)
The 2001 amendment added the second sentence to Subdivision (1)(D) and made stylistic
changes in the subdivision designations

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Decisions sua sponte
Purpose
Request for hearing
Supplemental memoranda
When rule applies
Cited
Decisions sua sponte.
While a court may refrain from addressing a
matter that is not submitted for decision under
this rule, nothing in this rule or any other rule
bars a court from deciding such a matter sua
sponte Scott v Majors, 1999 UT App 139, 980
P2d 214, cert denied, 994 P2d 1271 (Utah
1999).
No notice to submit for decision under this
rule is required, and a trial therefore correctly
determined that it could rule on pending motions sua sponte Scott v Majors, 1999 UT App
139, 980 P2d 214, cert denied, 994 P2d 1271
(Utah 1999)
Purpose.
The purpose of the code of judicial admims-

tration is not to create or modify substantive
rights of litigants, but to bring order to the
manner in which the courts operate Scott v
Majors, 1999 UT App 139, 980 P2d 214, cert
denied, 994 P2d 1271 (Utah 1999).
Request for hearing.
Once a request for hearing by one of the
parties has been granted and the matter set for
hearing, the other party has a right to rely upon
such setting regardless of whether it made its
own request Price v Armour, 949 P2d 1251
(Utah 1997)
Supplemental memoranda.
The plural "memoranda" in Subdivision (l)(a)
refers to all memoranda received by the court
— from all parties that either oppose or support
any motion — and does not mean that each
party may submit more than one memorandum, thus, the trial court was well within its
discretion in refusing to accept a supplemental
memorandum that was submitted without
prior invitation and outside the bounds of pro-

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SANDY COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEOPOLDINA OSEQUERA,
Plaintiff,

RULING ON MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT

VS<

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant.

Judge: DENISE P. LINDBERG
Date: 12/12/2000

Clerk: loriw
Plaintiff's Rule 60(b)(6) Motion is denied. The court acknoledges
that the parties may not have been timely notified of its
Memorandum Decision dated 2-29-00 affirming the Arbitrator's Award
and denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court
apologizes to the parties for any inconvenience that resulted, but
notes that it repeatedly denied requests to set additional pretrial
conferences on the basis that judgment had already entered in the
case. Accordingly, the parties cannot now claim that they were not
aware of the Court's judgment, at least by May 2d. The Court has
reviewed all the submissions since the entry of its February 2 9th
decision and nothing in those documents calls into question the
Court's original decision. Request for Oral Argument on the Rule
60(b)(6) is denied. The case is over.
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